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Dancing on the Brexit Cliff Edge 
The Key to the Exit Negotiations Lies in British Domestic Policy 
Nicolai von Ondarza 
The negotiations on the Brexit withdrawal agreement are heading for the endgame: 
An agreement is to be reached in October – at the latest in November 2018 – if the 
United Kingdom is to leave the EU in an orderly manner in March 2019, as planned. 
But the EU-27 and the British government are still a long way from reaching this 
agreement. Above all, British domestic policy is unpredictable: There is neither a 
majority for any form of Brexit, nor a substantial change of opinion against Brexit, 
as such. Any outcome of the Brexit negotiations threatens to trigger a political crisis 
in the UK, further increasing the risk of a disruptive exit. 
 
The Brexit negotiations are stuck in a tem-
poral paradox – on the one hand, time is 
running out for the British and the EU-27, 
while on the other hand, the handling of 
Brexit will continue well into the 2020s. 
First, Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) sets a limit of two years to 
regulate the withdrawal of a member state 
from the European Union (EU). For the 
United Kingdom (UK), this deadline ends on 
29 March 2019, when the country will leave 
the EU without a settlement if there is no 
agreement or extension of the deadline by 
then. In order to have time for the neces-
sary ratification, the negotiators on both 
sides actually wanted to reach an agree-
ment in October 2018; if necessary, a last-
minute agreement would still be possible 
in November or December. 
For affected citizens and businesses alike, 
this is very late: Nobody knows yet under 
what conditions EU citizens will be able to 
live and work in the UK from 30 March, 
and under what conditions they will be 
able to trade with the UK. 
At the same time, a real clarification of 
the question concerning the future relation-
ship still lies far in the future. The with-
drawal agreement – if it is concluded – 
is intended exclusively to regulate the mo-
dalities of separation (rights of EU citizens 
living in the UK and vice versa, financial 
obligations of the UK, border with Northern 
Ireland) and to allow a transition phase 
until the end of 2020. During that tran-
sition, the UK is set to formally leave the 
EU, but it will remain in the Internal Mar-
ket and Customs Union, bound by EU law. 
A political declaration on the withdrawal 
treaty is intended to outline the framework 
for the future relationship. The future rela-
tionship will, however, only be fully nego-
tiated in detail during the transition until 
2020 – or possibly even beyond. In short, 
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the Brexit negotiations must start in 
autumn 2018 in a sprint, but only as part 
of a longer negotiation marathon. 
Northern Ireland in Focus 
In this marathon of negotiations, negotia-
tors on both sides are already well advanced 
on separation issues, despite the difficult 
negotiations. According to joint statements, 
about 80 per cent of the withdrawal agree-
ment is politically agreed, for example on 
the basic structure of the agreement, on 
safeguarding citizens’ rights (with some 
exceptions), on the financial obligations of 
the UK, and on the modalities for the tran-
sition phase. But these agreements are 
meaningless if no agreement is reached on 
the overall package – including the tran-
sition phase. 
As in most negotiations, the remaining 
20 per cent are the most controversial. 
Technical issues with high political rele-
vance are still open. These include, for 
example, the question of the institutional 
mechanisms for implementing the with-
drawal agreement, i.e., what rights the EU 
Court of Justice will have. The protection 
of geographical indicators in the UK after 
Brexit (e.g. Champagne, Nuremberg ginger-
bread, etc.) – an important economic 
factor for the EU worldwide – is also still 
a point of contention. 
The biggest obstacle, however, is how 
to deal with the Irish-British border in 
Northern Ireland. This future EU external 
border is of enormous importance for EU 
member Ireland, both because of its impor-
tance for the Northern Ireland peace pro-
cess and because of the close economic ties 
between the two parts of the island (see 
SWP Comment 7/2017). With 208 border 
crossings, the border also has more cross-
ings than the entire EU external border in 
Eastern Europe – de facto it is hardly con-
trollable and therefore of great importance 
for the EU as a whole. From the beginning 
of the Brexit negotiations, the EU-27, sup-
ported in particular by Germany, have 
made keeping this border open a central 
criterion for a withdrawal agreement. 
At the same time, the internal contradic-
tions of Brexit are in focus with the border 
in Northern Ireland. The British govern-
ment has set three incompatible targets (see 
Figure 1 
The Northern Ireland trilemma
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Figure 1): Prime Minister Theresa May has 
always stressed to her own people and party 
that Britain will leave the EU’s Internal 
Market and Customs Union. Anything else 
is dismissed as a betrayal of the referen-
dum. In December 2017, however, the 
British government promised the EU-27 to 
keep the border open in any case. To this 
end, the withdrawal agreement is to spell 
out a “backstop” option with which the 
border can be kept open, even if this cannot 
be guaranteed by the general British-Euro-
pean relationship – theoretically, even if 
the EU and the UK fail to agree a future 
trading agreement. Finally, May has prom-
ised the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP), which supports the govern-
ment, not to create controls between North-
ern Ireland and the rest of the UK. 
Since then, the negotiations on Northern 
Ireland have stalled. The British govern-
ment categorically rejects the proposal for a 
backstop presented by the EU Commission 
in March 2018 (“No Prime Minister could 
ever sign this”). This saw the creation of a 
common regulatory area between the EU-27 
and Northern Ireland, with the latter effec-
tively remaining in the Customs Union and 
parts of the Internal Market. This is regarded 
in the UK as breaking up the integrity of 
the United Kingdom itself, not least because 
the Scottish government also wants a spe-
cial status vis-à-vis the EU for Scotland. 
However, the British government has not 
yet presented its own proposal. The rejec-
tion of the EU-27 proposal, on the other 
hand, is shared by all parties in the UK. The 
best way to mitigate the backstop would be 
a statement on the future relationship, with 
the prospect that it would never be needed. 
Wide Front against Chequers 
But it is precisely this political declaration 
that is the second major obstacle. For a long 
time, the British government has been 
negotiating mainly with itself about the 
future relationship, while the EU-27 have 
stood firm on a clear position: The UK 
should be integrated into the EU’s existing 
relations with third countries, i.e., either 
participate in the Internal Market with all 
rights and obligations, as Norway does, as 
part of the European Economic Area, or 
conclude a deepened free trade agreement 
with the EU as a third country, such as 
Canada. The latter would allow tariff-free 
trade but result in significant cuts in mar-
ket access for workers and (financial) ser-
vices, and exclude the UK from the EU’s 
common regulatory area – and thus also 
trigger the backstop for Northern Ireland. 
In July 2018 Theresa May, under intense 
political pressure, gathered her government 
behind the strategy named after the loca-
tion of the Chequers plan meeting. Accord-
ing to the strategy, the UK wants to keep a 
“common rule book” with the EU’s Internal 
Market for goods. The country is also to re-
main in the Customs Union in the medium 
term until new technical possibilities for 
a solution have been found. In contrast, 
May’s strategy proposes removing the 
remaining freedoms for services, capital, 
people, and other EU policy areas from 
Britain. The EU rules should also not apply 
to purely domestic products either, and the 
British Parliament would retain a principal 
veto right (but with consequences if the UK 
decides to deviate from EU rules). This strat-
egy is being sold to the EU-27 by May as the 
only acceptable solution in the UK. 
The Chequers plan is being rejected by 
the hard Brexiteers in the UK as well as 
by the EU-27. EU opponents such as con-
servative MPs Jacob Rees-Moog and Boris 
Johnson see Chequers as a plan to bind the 
UK in the long term to a “vassal status” vis-
à-vis the EU in which it (partially) accepts 
EU legislation without having a say. EU 
negotiator Michel Barnier and all national 
governments of the EU-27, on the other 
hand, have made it clear that although 
parts of the Chequers plan are a good basis 
for negotiations, the central proposal – 
partial participation in the Internal Market 
without legally binding enforcement – 
violates the EU’s central red lines. This would 
divide the four freedoms, endanger the In-
ternal Market, and at the same time allow 
British companies to gain unfair competi-
tive advantages over their EU competitors. 
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In short, to cushion the backstop in 
Northern Ireland, the political declaration 
on the future relationship between the EU 
and Britain should be as specific as possible. 
But the more detailed the statement be-
comes, the more the EU will insist on its red 
lines on the integrity of the Internal Market 
and demand more concessions from the 
British. This, in turn, increases the risk of 
the withdrawal agreement failing in the 
British Parliament. 
A High-risk Political Game 
The most critical element in the Brexit 
negotiations in the short term is the vola-
tility of British domestic policy. For internal 
political reasons, the British government 
has already made a legal commitment 
to submit the withdrawal agreement and 
political declaration to the two houses of 
Parliament. Only after it has gained approv-
al from the House of Commons can it sign 
the withdrawal agreement with the EU. But 
that approval is more than uncertain: 
First of all, May only has an extremely 
narrow majority. Since she called snap elec-
tions in June 2017, she has headed a minor-
ity government. The current 315 Conserva-
tives, backed up by 10 members of the 
Northern Irish DUP, only achieve a majority 
among the 650 seats because the 7 mem-
bers of the Irish Nationalist Sinn Fein from 
Northern Ireland do not accept their seats. 
Even a handful of dissenters can cost May 
her majority at any time. The pressure 
comes from at least four sides. 
Firstly, the hard Brexiteers in the Conser-
vative Party categorically reject the Chequers 
plan, and even more so any further con-
cessions to the EU. According to their own 
statements, the Tories assembled in the 
“European Research Group” (ERG) have up 
to 80 MPs who are willing to vote against 
the government on Chequers. At least 25 
have made this public, including former 
ministers David Davis and Steve Baker, who 
resigned in protest against Chequers. In the 
past, the ERG has repeatedly managed to 
impose hard interpretations of the Brexit 
vote in the Conservative Party and Parlia-
ment with threats against the Prime Minis-
ter to vote against the government. This 
group also has enough deputies to initiate 
a leadership challenge against Theresa May 
in her party at any time – but not enough 
to make her own candidate Prime Minister. 
By rejecting the withdrawal agreement, 
however, they could enforce the “WTO 
scenario”, which they see as their preferred 
option. Crucially, at least in public, they 
play down the costs of a no deal Brexit – 
despite most economic studies stating 
otherwise – arguing that after a short-term 
hiccup, Britain could recover, and even gain, 
by signing free trade deals around the world 
and undercutting European regulations. 
On the other side of the spectrum, at 
least 12 members of the Conservative Party 
can be identified who openly advocate the 
closest possible ties to the EU. In theory, 
they too have the possibility of costing the 
government the majority if the entire oppo-
sition vote against it as well. In the course 
of the parliamentary process on Brexit, they 
have succeeded, among other things, in 
strengthening the House of Commons’ deci-
sion rights on Brexit (“meaningful vote”). In 
the past, this group flirted time and again 
with rebellion against the government and 
only failed to gain a majority in the House 
of Commons for a Customs Union with the 
EU against the wishes of the government 
because five Labour MPs voted with the gov-
ernment. Although they could cost the gov-
ernment the majority, they are less likely 
to risk a no deal outcome than the ERG. 
The Northern Irish DUP is the third 
Achilles’ heel of May’s minority govern-
ment. The DUP is itself a conflict party in 
Northern Ireland and stands for a clear 
unionist course. The party is a staunch 
supporter of Brexit, even though the major-
ity of Northern Ireland’s population has 
voted for remaining in the EU. The party’s 
self-image and raison d'être, however, is its 
attachment to the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. For the DUP, 
this is much more important than Brexit or 
the survival of the May government. The 10 
DUP MEPs have therefore openly threatened 
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to withdraw support from the May adminis-
tration if it enters into an agreement with 
the EU that would in some way lead to a 
differentiation between Northern Ireland 
and the rest of the United Kingdom. This is 
true, according to the party’s public state-
ment, even if it is only an option of last 
resort, as with the “backstop”. 
The fourth crucial factor is Labour as the 
main opposition party, which, with its 257 
MEPs, could help May gain a majority at 
any time. Indeed, the Labour leadership 
around Jeremy Corbyn has clearly accepted 
the Brexit vote. Labour has therefore in the 
past voted with the government in favour 
of triggering Article 50. However, the party 
has submitted six tests for the withdrawal 
treaty – formulated in such a way that no 
form of Brexit will ever fulfil them – and 
has already announced its intention to vote 
against the withdrawal agreement. 
The rejections by the Liberal Democrats 
and the Scottish National Party are even 
clearer. Politically, none of the opposition 
parties have an interest in taking respon-
sibility for the Brexit result. Furthermore, 
particularly Labour is speculating on early 
elections in the event of May’s failure. 
Although Labour is also divided on Brexit 
issues, in the past only five pro-Brexit 
Labour MPs voted with the government. 
In a nutshell: There is currently no 
majority in the British Parliament for any 
Brexit variant. While Theresa May has to 
fight for every vote for approval of the with-
drawal agreement and political declaration, 
the opposition cannot be expected to help. 
If both the DUP and even some of the 25 
MPs who form the core of the ERG vote 
against her, she has hardly any chance to 
get an agreement through Parliament. If 
only one of these groups rebels, she would 
still have to fight for every single MP to get 
over the line. 
The Clock Is Ticking 
In light of these differences, the outcome 
of the Brexit negotiations is still completely 
unknown. Five scenarios are on the agenda 
for the medium term. Two factors are im-
portant for the evaluation of these sce-
narios. On the one hand, the default option 
in Article 50 negotiations is not a return to 
the status quo, but rather the UK dropping 
out of the EU on 29 March 2019 without 
any transition or rules governing future co-
operation. On the other hand, not all open 
questions need to be clarified before with-
drawal, but rather “only” the withdrawal 
agreement and the political declaration on 
the framework of future relations. 
Scenario 1: Orderly Brexit 
The scenario that the negotiators on both 
sides are working towards is an orderly 
Brexit on 29 March 2019. This requires the 
EU-27 and the UK to have agreed by then 
the withdrawal agreement and the political 
declaration for future cooperation. From 
the standpoint of the EU-27, this has to in-
clude a legally binding backstop for Northern 
Ireland, the remaining separation modali-
ties, and the transition. In order to have 
sufficient time for parliamentary approval 
and the implementation processes, an agree-
ment in autumn 2018 is necessary. Further-
more, the British Parliament has set a dead-
line of 21 January 2019 for its government 
to conclude the withdrawal negotiations. 
Otherwise, the government will have to 
obtain approval for a new mandate from 
Parliament – which is likely to be difficult, 
given the majority situation outlined above. 
If an agreement between the British gov-
ernment and the EU-27 is reached, a num-
ber of steps will still have to be taken. The 
most critical step is the vote in the British 
House of Commons. Looking at May’s recent 
speeches, the strategy of the May govern-
ment to get its own parliamentarians to vote 
in favour is already taking shape: To give 
them the choice of either accepting the 
agreement May negotiated with the EU, or 
take personal political responsibility for the 
consequences of a “no deal” scenario and – 
addressed particularly at the Brexiteers – ac-
cepting the risk that new elections, a Labour 
government, and a second referendum could 
follow. If May succeeds in this, final approval 
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is necessary on the European side from the 
European Parliament (EP) and the European 
Council. The EP has also set clear conditions 
for the Brexit negotiations – in particular 
the protection of civil rights and the open 
border with Northern Ireland. However, 
since this is largely congruent with the prior-
ities adopted by the EU-27, simultaneous 
approval by the member states and rejec-
tion by the EP can be regarded as unlikely. 
The UK could then leave the EU on 29 
March next year in an orderly manner and 
remain in the Internal Market and Customs 
Union until at least the end of 2020 as part 
of the transition phase. Nevertheless, even 
an orderly Brexit does not mean the end of 
Brexit uncertainty. Because the political 
declaration can only outline future rela-
tions – legally non-binding – these have 
to be negotiated during the transitional 
period, with another cliff edge looming in 
January 2021. 
Scenario 2: Extension 
If the House of Commons rejects the out-
come of the negotiations, or if the negotia-
tors are unable to reach an agreement, a 
politically and economically very volatile 
situation threatens to emerge. A govern-
ment crisis in London is then almost inevi-
table, as are new negotiations among the 
EU-27 on how to proceed. A fall of Theresa 
May and either a new Prime Minister from 
the Conservative Party or new elections are 
the logical domestic consequences. 
The simplest way legally to defuse the 
situation between the EU-27 and the UK 
during this intra-British crisis would be to 
extend the negotiations in accordance with 
Article 50 TEU. This allows the parties to 
extend the negotiation period through a 
unanimous decision of the European Coun-
cil of 27 in agreement with the UK. Legally, 
there are no limits to how long or how 
often the deadline can be extended. For 
example, an extension to the end of 2020, 
i.e., the currently planned transition phase, 
is conceivable. During the extended nego-
tiation period, the UK would continue to be 
an EU member with all rights and obliga-
tions. In this context, it would also have to 
hold EP elections next May, which could 
easily turn into a vote on the Brexit process. 
What is most critical, however, is that 
the supporters of Brexit have already legally 
anchored the exit date as part of the parlia-
mentary process on Brexit. The British gov-
ernment can therefore only request or 
agree to an extension if it has obtained par-
liamentary approval. Since some of the sup-
porters of Brexit within the UK Cabinet, 
such as Michael Gove, only support the gov-
ernment’s current strategy because they 
want to “cross the line”, such an extension 
would be at least as difficult to get through 
as a negotiated result. 
Scenario 3: “Managed No Deal” 
If there is neither agreement nor an exten-
sion of the deadline, the UK will leave the 
EU without any settlement, by automatic 
operation of law. In trade, this leaves WTO 
rules as a fallback, including the obligatory 
reintroduction of tariffs, while other areas 
– including citizen’s rights, the EU budget, 
justice and home affairs cooperation, and 
participation in EU regulatory schemes – 
have no such fallback options. The eco-
nomic, political, and personal consequences 
would be very grave for the UK, but (to a 
lesser extent) also the EU-27. 
The British government is therefore 
working in its preparations for non-agree-
ment on the assumption that it can at least, 
to some extent, mitigate these consequences 
through a series of individual agreements 
– with the EU as a whole or bilaterally 
with its member states. In the spirit of such 
a “managed no deal”, the British govern-
ment has already written to all 27 EU mem-
ber states, for example to negotiate bilater-
ally about access to their airspace for British 
airlines in case of no deal. Representatives 
of the citizens concerned are also constantly 
calling for their rights to be safeguarded by 
means of a separate individual agreement, 
even if the overall talks fail. 
The conditions for a “managed no deal” 
are, however, extremely poor: a volatile po-
litical environment in the UK, a negotiating 
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situation in which negotiations conducted 
for two years would have failed, a potential 
withholding of British budget payments to 
the EU, a European Parliament in the mid-
dle of an election campaign, and an enor-
mous flood of areas to be regulated give rise 
to doubts that amicable management with-
out a withdrawal agreement is possible in 
the short term. 
Scenario 4: “Disruptive No Deal” 
The transition to the most negative sce-
nario – a disruptive Brexit without any 
common rules – is therefore fluid. Legally, 
this remains the default option if there is 
no agreement: The UK leaves the EU with-
out a transition phase, without any rules 
for EU citizens, and without any agree-
ments for future cooperation. 
However, even in this case, the adminis-
trations on both sides should, and will, 
work to avoid complete chaos. The EU Com-
mission’s “Brexit Preparedness” communi-
cations therefore assume that, at least in 
the short term, only unilateral measures by 
both sides are able to limit the worst con-
sequences. But even if planes still fly across 
the English Channel, the reintroduction of 
tariffs and the abrupt expulsion of the EU’s 
second largest economy from the EU’s 
single market alone will lead to consider-
able disruptions. 
Even then, it will be necessary to main-
tain dialogue. Britain remains one of the 
EU’s most important neighbours in any 
Brexit scenario. Even if the cooperation of 
both sides would be impaired for years if 
no agreement were reached, in the medium 
and long terms, both sides will have to re-
turn to the negotiating table – even, and 
especially, after a chaotic Brexit – in order 




One conceivable outcome of a failure of the 
negotiations – especially in the event of a 
rejection of the withdrawal agreement in 
the House of Commons negotiations – is a 
second referendum. In principle, European 
politicians such as the President of the Euro-
pean Council, Donald Tusk, and French 
President Emmanuel Macron have again 
and again kept the possibility open for Brit-
ain to remain in the EU. At least until Brexit 
is formally implemented next March, the 
prevailing legal opinion is that it is legally 
possible for the UK to remain in the EU. 
Politically, however, a second referen-
dum is a long way off. First, there has been 
no substantial change in opinion against 
Brexit in the UK. Apart from a few outliers, 
surveys since 2016 show across the board 
that the country is still largely divided 50-
50 on the question of EU membership, with 
only a marginal advantage for remaining. 
Second, a second referendum requires a 
parliamentary vote, which is hardly likely 
to take place, given the current majority 
situation. Added to this is the time factor – 
the parliamentary procedure for the 2016 
referendum took more than six months. A 
second referendum would therefore require 
new elections in the UK, the electoral vic-
tory of a party or coalition in favour of a 
second referendum, and, finally, an exten-
sion of Article 50 to hold that referendum. 
This chain of events has become possible 
since Labour, at its party conference in Sep-
tember 2018, voted in principle for a sec-
ond referendum as a fallback option. At the 
same time, the Labour leadership has sent 
conflicting signals whether “remain” should 
actually be on offer in such a referendum, 
or whether it should just be between no 
deal and a negotiated result of Brexit. 
In short: A second referendum could 
not be organised by March 2019 and would 
only be possible after a political crisis in 
the UK, new elections, a Labour election vic-
tory, and a full commitment to revisiting 
the referendum. 




The Brexit negotiations are a “dance on the 
cliff edge”. Analysis of the negotiations has 
shown that falling off the cliff into one of the 
“no deal” scenarios remains a realistic op-
tion, despite both sides having a fundamen-
tal interest in reaching an agreement. Po-
litical and economic decision-makers should 
therefore prepare for the no deal scenarios. 
The biggest challenges on the road to an 
agreement are inextricably linked: securing 
an open border in Northern Ireland, the po-
litical declaration on future relations, and 
obtaining parliamentary approval in Brit-
ain. Theresa May’s majority here is more 
than uncertain. Given the fragile situation 
in the British House of Commons, where no 
form of Brexit has a majority, any of the 
possible scenarios seems to lead to a politi-
cal crisis in Britain. 
Furthermore, the EU-27 and the UK gov-
ernment have made their red lines so clear 
that an agreement without loss of face on at 
least one side seems almost impossible. In 
terms of power politics, the EU is undoubt-
edly in a stronger position, as the UK would 
be more affected by any of the scenarios in 
the event of a disagreement. Nor can, or 
should, the EU resolve the self-inflicted block-
ade of British domestic politics by letting 
Britain pick the cherries from the single 
market or sacrifice the interests of its mem-
ber Ireland to an agreement with London. 
Nevertheless, the EU-27, and Germany in 
particular, should not lose sight of its long-
term strategic goals in the sometimes heated 
negotiations: Yes, protect the single market, 
but also find a sustainable partnership with 
their future geostrategic neighbour, the UK. 
Beyond its red lines, the EU should there-
fore be ready to find a creative special solu-
tion for Northern Ireland. Finally, if talks 
break down, decision-makers on both sides 
should be open to accepting an extension 
rather than one of the no deal scenarios. 
Figure 2 
Medium-term scenarios for the Brexit negotiations
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